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112. Introduction
In many successful late-industrializing countries in the
twentieth century that are historically, culturally, and
geographically distinct, business groups with operating units
in technologically unrelated industries have acted as the
microeconomic agent of industrial growth. This was the case
in prewar Japan and continues to be the case in postwar
Argentina, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. Why this business
form has characterized countries industrializing "late" --- a
process of borrowing foreign technology in the absence of any
proprietary products or processes in the marketplace --- , and
why it succeeded in the early phases of catching-up whereas
the advanced-country conglomerate has had an undistinguished
performance, are the issues explored in this paper.
A seminal work by Nathaniel Leff (1978; 1979) emphasizes
that business groups evolved in response to the acute market
imperfections in products, finance, and information
associated with underdevelopment. While acknowledging the
significance of market imperfections as the background to the
emergence of groups, we go one step further and use internal
resource-base theories of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Nelson
and Winter, 1982) to explore the significance of
organizational knowledge and resulting increasing returns in
the group form which, even in mature markets and especially
in late industrialization, constitute a sustainable source of
competitiveness. The operational premise of internal
resource utilization approaches to diversification is that
firms can exploit assets such as specialized capital
equipment, technological and organizational know-how, and
goodwill owing to economies of scope of sharable inputs and
transaction cost-economies (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1980,
1982; Baumol, Panzer, and Willig, 1982; Levy and Harber,
1986). They can utilize these resources more efficiently for
internal diversification than external sale or lease because
such resources cannot necessarily realize their full value on
the market. In the case of late industrialization, however,
this internal resource-based diversification does not
initially come from the production process (as is assumed in
Teece, 1982) because of a technology constraint. Rather, it
originates in foreign technology acquisition which, thus,
becomes a necessary condition for corporate success. In the
best diversified business groups, the capability to acquire
foreign technology is transformed into organizational
know-how that provides a key resource in the effectiveness of
corporate growth through diversification.
In the first two parts of the paper we briefly survey
diversified industrial groups in historical contexts and then
across a broad array of late-industrializing countries. Then
we consider the historical specificity of diversified
business groups in late industrialization by discussing three
questions: Why wasn't diversification prevalent among firms
attempting to catch-up in earlier historical periods? Why
was the strategy of leading late-industrializing firms one of
3diversification rather than specialization? Why was their
chosen diversification path one involving technologically-
unrelated industries? We next present our core argument
about the transformation of technology acquisition into a
competitive asset, and then illustrate our points with
evidence from South Korea, where big diversified industrial
groups in mid-tech industries have gained an especially large
share of world output. Finally, we analyze why the behavior
of the late-industrializing group differs from that of the
American conglomerate.
2. Overview: Historical Paradigm of Technolovgy Acquisition
Owing to the coalescence of an international technology
market at the time of late-industrialization, any cash-rich
firm theoretically could borrow foreign technology and
instantly establish itself as an oligopolistic domestic
player in a capital-intensive, "mid-tech" industry (Amsden,
1989). This potential to employ foreign technology was
unavailable to earlier firms attempting to catch up at a time
when world technology markets were still ill-defined
(witness, say, Britain's strict prohibition of textile
technology exports during the First Industrial Revolution,
which forced Samuel Slater to memorize British know-how in
order to establish his American textile mill, compared with
the RCA Corporation in the 1950s, which "remained prepared to
license its technology to almost anyone who asked and would
pay the fee" (Sobel, 1986, p. 152)).
Despite the availability of foreign technology, however,
large firms in the particular historical context of late-
industrialization could no longer grow through a progression
similar to the Chandlerian pattern followed by big business
dating from the Second Industrial Revolution: first
specializing in producing a narrow product line based on
proprietary technology, and then diversifying into related
industries (Chandler, 1977; 1990). This is because those
very large industrial enterprises that arose in the late
nineteenth century in the United States and Germany (and to a
lesser degree other European countries) achieved
Schumpeterian technological and organizational breakthroughs
which, in turn, resulted in the formation of international
oligopolies, both in product markets and in technology
generation (Hikino and Amsden, 1994). Latecomers, therefore,
faced entry and growth barriers based on first-mover
advantages in many of the new, capital-intensive industries
(Chandler, 1990, ch. 2). As long as the incumbents continued
to generate radically new products and processes within their
technology trajectories and dominate global markets,
challengers were defensively forced to adjust their growth
strategies within the competitive rules and regulations set
by these oligopolistic players.
Latecomers could borrow foreign technology and utilize
low factor costs such as wages and possibly subsidized credit
to enter the bottom, soft segments of oligopolistic markets.
But until they themselves became major innovators, they could
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not expand into higher segments, and, thus, their overall
potential to expand in these sectors was limited. Instead,
latecomers were forced to grow through diversification. In
the absence of proprietary technology to exploit in related
industries, and in the presence of potentially high profit
rates in "pre-modernized" start-up industries, their pattern
of diversification tended to be opportunistic and
technologically unrelated.
When initially expanding, the most successful business
groups experienced a large number of technology acquisition
transactions, first in borrowing foreign technology to
establish and expand plants in their "flagship" or original
industry, and then in importing technology to diversify, or
enter new industries. The greater the number of technology
acquisition transactions they engaged in, the greater their
potential to unpackage technology imports and acquire
(internalize) the skills involved in such projects.
Moreover, the greater their experience, the greater their
ability to routinize this function and free up human
resources for other tasks. Step-by-step, rather than in a
great Schumpeterian leap, the best business groups in late-
industrialization mobilized project execution skills in-
house. These were generic skills, originating from foreign
technology acquisition, applicable to many industries, and
diffused among industry-level subsidiaries within an
organized internal labor market fostered by deliberate group-
level training and coordination. The mobilization of
6"fungible" skills in project execution through
internalization served as a shared resource (Teece, 1982),
which enabled diversification to occur at lower cost (and
greater speed) than if such skills were bought for each
diversification transaction in the market. In turn, skills
related to project execution tended to have a positive
spillover on acquiring plant-level production capability,
another aspect of technology acquisition.
Although project execution skills may become a shared
asset for the group, they remain too tacit to become a public
good, as in the case of, say, the patent of a specialized
firm. Therefore, project execution skills may be assumed to
be perishable: unless they are used, they are lost. Their
perishability is especially likely if managers or engineers
who embody such skills are not given an opportunity to use
them. Unlike physical assets, human assets may individually
or collectively exit from the firm. Project execution skills
may then become marketable: people who embody them try to
capture their market value by spinning off a venture after
they exit, for instance, thereby increasing competition for
the incumbent.
Sharable human capabilities at the group level also
involve functions other than expansion-induced project
execution, such as transactions related to dealing with a
developmental state. The shared resource involving project
execution, however, is among the most important and tends to
be subject to increasing returns if the group succeeds in
7diversifying further. This is because the "remembering-by-
doing" of technology acquisition is itself constantly
changing, analogous to the learning-by-doing related to
changing product composition of the specialized economy
theorized by Lucas (1988) and Stokey (1988).
3. Divergence and Convergence Among Diversifiers
Big businesses from late-industrializing countries have
dramatically increased their share of world output relative
to those from advanced economies (see Table 1). Of the
world's 500 largest industrial enterprises, Japan expanded
its share from 31 in 1962 to 128 in 1992. Excluding Japan,
the share of late industrializers rose during this period
from two to 33. Of those 33, as many as 12 were from South
Korea (which is why we use South Korean evidence later to
illustrate our points). /1
By comparison with big business in developed market
economies, big business in late industrialization is
characterized by a relatively large proportion of: (a)
foreign-owned firms (although foreign-owned firms are also
prevalent in an advanced economy such as Canada); (b) state-
owned enterprises; and (c) diversified business groups. The
predominance of large foreign-owned firms in the "South"
tends to be greatest in Latin America. In 1987, four out of
Mexico's ten largest companies were estimated to be foreign-
owned (depending on how state companies are defined), all in
the automobile industry. The comparable number of foreign-
owned firms for Brazil was three (all in petroleum). By
contrast, neither Taiwan nor South Korea had any foreign-
owned firms among its top ten business enterprises (Gereffi,
1990).
With respect to ownership and business structure among
only indigenous, locally-owned enterprises, Table 2 reveals
sharp differences between advanced and late-industrializing
economies. Among the biggest 70 companies from advanced
economies, only six were state-owned. All the rest (ranked
in terms of sales in 1987) were located in Chandlerian scale-
intensive industries such as chemicals, electrical machinery,
and transportation equipment, and most of them were
administered by salaried managers. By contrast, of the top
70 industrial enterprises from late-industrializing
economies, as many as 39 were state-owned, clustered mostly
in resource-related, scale-intensive industries such as
petroleum (28 companies out of the total) and primary metals
(which includes iron and steel).
The importance of the diversified group structure among
indigenous private enterprises from the "South" compared with
the "North" is also evident in Table 2. Out of the 31
largest private industrial enterprises from the South, as
many as 26 were diversified groups. By contrast, out of the
64 largest private industrial enterprises from the North,
none was a widely diversified group or conglomerate.
Table 3 gives a further breakdown of the largest 31
late-industrializing private enterprises. Whatever the
I
9region, the structure of the great majority of them is the
diversified group. Only five out of the largest 31 private
late-industrializing companies were specialized, three in
chemicals and food. Almost all were owned and controlled by
families, but had managerial hierarchies.
In terms of the industry distribution of the 200 largest
operating nits from late-industrializing countries
(including the subsidiaries of state-owned firms but
excluding those of foreign multinationals), 42 were in
petroleum-related industries. Another 29 were in "high-
tech", although typically in the labor-intensive, bottom-end
of high-tech sectors. As many as 60 were in mid-tech
industries (Hikino and Amsden, 1994). It is largely
companies in mid-tech industries (as well as companies
attempting to move out of the lower segments of high-tech
sectors) that confronted technological barriers to global
expansion in the early 1990s.
Diversified business groups in late industrialization
emerge from different backgrounds. Thus, from many distinct
historical patterns and roots there is a convergence towards
a similar unrelated diversification strategy and group
structure, with diversification and convergence accelerating
after World War II. Even within a region, the origins of
industrial groups are diverse, as the following brief survey
suggests. /2
In the case of Asia, the generalists who established
South Korea's chagbo arose out of the rentseeking and
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business opportunities surrounding American foreign aid
allocation in the 1950s (Amsden, 1989; 1994). For instance,
the Samsung group (ranked second in Table 3) had an
indifferent start in overseas trading in 1938 but revived in
1953 with the establishment of a subsidiary in a typical
import-substitution and capital-intensive industry, sugar
refining. The Hyundai group (ranked first in Table 3)
started as an automobile repair shop and then prospered as a
construction firm during the Korean and later Vietnam wars.
As in Japan, the chaebol benefited from government
incentives. The Daewoo group, with a ranking of four in
Table 3, was unusual in growing largely through acquisition,
mainly of ailing government-owned factories at bargain prices
(Jones and SaKong, 1980; Kim, 1987; Aguilar, 1985b).
In Taiwan, state-owned enterprises and relatively small
diversified industrial groups have been more prevalent than
in either Japan or Korea. Whereas in 1987 only one of ten
top Korean firms was state-owned, the comparable figure for
Taiwan was four (depending on how a public enterprise is
defined) (Gereffi, 1990). A typical small diversified
business in Taiwan is the Aurora group, with 12 strategic
business units but only 4,000 employees and total sales (in
1990) of merely $370 million (Wu, 1992).
Nevertheless, large private enterprise has hardly been
absent in Taiwan: in the early 1970s, Taiwan had a larger
share than Korea of manufacturing output accounted for by
firms with over 500 workers (Amsden, 1991); among the
I-
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"South's" top 200 operating units in 1985, as many as 18 were
from Taiwan, the same number as from Brazil (Hikino and
Amsden, 1994). As indicated in Table 3, one of Taiwan's
most diversified groups (Formosa Plastics) and one of its
most successful specialized firms (Tatung), ranked 14th and
24th among the South's largest private companies. Taiwan's
Far Eastern Group, originally based in textiles and forced to
diversify due to bleak market prospects, was cited by the
McKinsey consulting firm as one of East Asia's leading
diversified companies (Chu and MacMurray, 1993).
Taiwan's diversified groups would probably be larger
were it not for government opposition to the emergence of
private economic concentration (ethnic differences once
divided the Taiwanese business community and the Mainlander
government). According to a history of Formosa Plastics, the
government refused its request to diversify into ethylene
production because it conflicted with the investment planning
of state-owned China Petroleum Company (Taniura, 1989). In
1993 permission was denied to Formosa Plastic's proposal for
a major investment in China. On the other hand, where big
business has arisen in Taiwan, the government has played a
key role, as in Korea. In Formosa Plastics's case: "we
cannot by any means ignore the forward-looking attitudes
taken by those government bureaucrats] who lent support to
the [founder's] enterprise" (Taniura, 1989, p. 69).
In Hong Kong, British merchant houses were active in the
creation of groups, such as Swire Pacific and Jardine
12
Matheson (ranked 16th and 18th respectively in Table 3).
The Hutchison-Whampoa group (ranked 27th) was also
established by a British trading house, with subsidiaries
spanning petroleum and telecommunications (in Britain). A
40% controlling interest was ultimately acquired by the
Cheung Kong property company, which began a process of
transferring management from expatriates to ethnic Chinese,
with a new strategy to expand in China.
Diversified industrial groups have been prominent
throughout southeast Asia. In Malaysia, most groups emerged
out of the plantation and mining operations of British
"agency houses," or merchant banks, such as Sime Darby and
Harrisons & Crossfield, which were subsequently either
nationalized or brought under government control (Saruwatori,
1991). The latter was the case of Sime Darby, which ranks
28th in Table 3. Unique among Malaysia's business groups is
OCBC, whose name and influence "are synonymous with that of
Morgan or Rockefeller" in the United States (Lim, 1981, p.
91). OCBC's activities span banking, insurance, tin mining
and smelting, rubber plantations, trading, hotels,
properties, investments, manufacturing (from engineering to
brewing), and management services. Its size is unknown,
however, because it is privately held by overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs.
Big business in Indonesia has included state-owned
enterprises and groups with Chinese, ribumi (indigenous),
and military/bureaucratic origins. Of the top ten groups,
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nine are Chinese-managed. Many have diversified into the
automotive industry (from dealerships to car assembly and
parts manufacture) as well as forestry and wood-based
industries. A common trait of most Indonesian groups is
involvement in finance and commodity distribution, banking,
insurance and foreign trade. "This indicates the importance
of merchant and usurer capital in the creation of these
groups" (Kano, 1989, p. 151). Salim, one of the largest
Chinese-owned groups, went from trading agricultural
commodities to investments in import-substitution, and from
export promotion to global diversification (Schwarz, 1991).
In Thailand, while traditional business groups arose out
of rice milling and commercial banking, a new elite emerged
in the 1960s in tandem with import substitution.
Manufacturing became the new groups' core activity. In 1979
each Thai industrial group on average owned and controlled 16
affiliates (Suehiro, 1985). The CP group and Siam Motor
groups each held as many as over 50 firms, with manufacturing
activities ranging from textiles, to automobiles, to food
processing (they do not appear in Table 3 because they do not
provide consolidated sales figures).
Similarly in Turkey, big industrial groups emerged out
of import substitution industrialization, dependent initially
on government support. As in Korea, such groups lacked
internal sources of finance and relied heavily on debt to
finance their expansion. Turkey's biggest groups --- Koc
(ranked eighth in Table 3), which produces industrial
14
products as well as consumer goods, and its rival Sabanci
(ranked tenth in Table 3), which produces textiles, tires,
and cement, among 50 or so other products, established
numerous tie-ups with foreign firms (as in Thailand).
Beginning in the 1970s there was a scramble to establish
general trading companies in Turkey along the lines of the
sogo-shosha of Japan (see Onis, 1993; Cho, 1987, discusses
the attempt to form general trading companies by groups in
Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey). The largest
Turkish trading company was ENKA Marketing, with exports of
roughly 5 percent of GNP in 1983, established by Turkey's
fourth largest group with over 40 affiliated companies in
trade, construction, and manufacturing (textile products,
foodstuffs and chemicals) (Cho, 1987).
In India the dominant form of corporate control by the
middle of the nineteenth century was the managing agency
system, originally established by British adventurers
(shareholders had to wait for a return on their investment
while the agent/promoter was assured of a return in the form
of a managing agent's commission). "The managing agency
system was ideally suited to the Hindu joint family system in
India," and provided the basis for the formation of modern
diversified industrial groups (Herdeck and Piramal, 1985,
p. 6). India's two major business groups, Tata and Birla
(ranked seventh and fifteenth in Table 3), date to the late
nineteenth century. The Tata group's founder was born in
1839 and, after a start in cotton textiles, established
15
India's first steel mill. The group now has subsidiaries in
textiles, steel, engineering, chemicals, consumer goods,
electronics, hotels, and trade (Nanda and Austin, 1992;
McDonald, 1993). The Birla group was founded by a Marwaris
family (the Marwaris are a Hindu community originally from
Rajasthan, traditionally engaged in trade and money-lending).
In 70 years the Birla group evolved into a producer of
aluminum, textiles, chemicals, automobiles, jute, cement,
tea, textile machinery, light engineering and other products.
No fewer than 30 of the Birla group's 175 companies are
listed among the top 250 corporations in India's private
sector (Herkeck and Piramal, 1985; Encarnation, 1989).
Turning to Latin America, the diversified industrial
group tends to be sandwiched in between foreign firms
(sometimes allied in groups with local firms) and state-owned
enterprises. Scattered evidence also indicates that
diversification may not be quite as technologically
unrelated as in Asia. In Mexico: "Of the 121 major groups,
all were substantially diversified, even though they usually
remained identified with a core product" (Camp, 1989: 174).
Some of Mexico's biggest groups (such as Vitro, with a
nucleus in glass) date from the first wave of modern Mexican
industrialization in the 1890s to 1930s (Haber, 1989). An
alliance among various firms, however, began to accelerate in
the mid-1960s. Mexico's largest group (Industrial Alfa,
which ranked 23rd in Table 3), was established in 1974 by
inheriting a number of iron and paper companies when the (now
16
extinct) Cuauhtemoc-HYLSA group split into two (Hoshino,
1990). The largest 100 Mexican firms in 1981 were roughly
estimated to account for 59 percent of GNP and 73 percent of
capital (Castaneda, 1982, p. 87). The subsidiaries of the
largest groups were, as in Asia, predominantly in
manufacturing. The top 50 Mexican groups were estimated in
1983 to have a total of 739 companies, 439 of which were in
industry (Cordero, Santin, and Tirado, 1983).
In the case of Brazil, almost two-thirds of its biggest
domestic enterprises were established before World War I
(Queiroz, 1962; 1965). As for the origins of Brazil's local
groups, "whether established by immigrants or families long
rooted in Brazil, one of the common features of the largest
Brazilian economic groups is that they moved into industry
via commerce" (Evans, 1979, p. 108). By the early 1970s
about half the firms among the top 100 companies were state-
owned (the comparable share for the top 50 companies was even
higher, roughly two-thirds), but among private firms in the
top 100, about 35 were in groups (13 in private domestic
groups and 22 in private foreign groups). Seven local
groups, five of them highly diversified in manufacturing,
were the central core of private domestic industry (Evans,
pp. 152-158). The only Brazilian firm to appear in Table 3
is Copersucar, which is a cooperative in food and chemicals.
Argentina's groups also evolved in two distinct periods,
the first (1860-1930) associated with agro-exports, and the
second (1930-1960) with import-substitution. Bunge Y Born,
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one of the largest groups, was founded by Belgian expatriates
as a trading company in the first wave (Ines Barbero, 1994).
Emblematic of the second phase of expansion was S.I.A.M,
founded by an Italian immigrant, Torcuato di Tella, who
believed as early as 1910 that while imported machines were
more efficient than any produced in Argentina, a domestic
model superior to either could be developed (Cochran and
Reina, 1962). In 1986 the top 15 Argentine groups
represented 22% of firms quoted on the Buenos Aires Stock
Exchange and were among the top five producers in 30
industries (Sguiglia, 1988).
South Africa's largest business group, the Anglo-
American Corporation, was formed in 1917 and has interests in
an estimated 1,300 South African companies (it is now
officially registered in Bermuda). It has a 34% share in De
Beers Consolidated (ranked 13th in Table 3), which is
involved in the distribution of some 80% of the world's
rough-diamond production (Pallister, Stewart and Lepper,
1987). Barlow Rand limited (ranked fifth in Table 3), also
established early in the twentieth century, started as South
Africa's sales agent for Caterpillar Company (an American
manufacturer of heavy equipment). This company is unique
among late-industrializing groups in that it became
controlled by salaried managers and its shares are publicly
held and dispersed. By 1990 the group's operations involved
144,000 employees and included mining, the manufacture of
cement, paint, electronics and engineering, heavy equipment,
18
building and construction supplies, packaging and paper,
appliances, sugar, food, and textiles.
Thus, industrial groups in late industrialization have
diverse origins, depending on the country: some have emerged
out of industry, others from mining, banking and trade; some
started with an staple export orientation dating from the
nineteenth century, others began in the twentieth century
with government support amidst import substitution (in
Chile's case, groups were strengthened by market
liberalization in the 1970s (Dahse, 1979)). Groups in late
industrialization also differ according to their relation
with foreign capital, and, therefore, the practical means to
acquire foreign technology. Some groups, such as many Korean
chaebol, thanks to their business strategies and/or
government policies, refuse the equity participation of
foreign enterprises. Others, such as Mexico's los grupos
aggressively seek opportunities of joint ventures. Due in
part to the relatively short history of these firms, and
partly owing to the underdevelopment of stock markets (and,
therefore, a market for corporate control), most groups are
still family controlled. Nevertheless, what is striking is
that despite diverse backgrounds, industrial groups with
holdings in technologically unrelated industries,
particularly manufacturing, have spearheaded late industrial
development.
19
The historical specificity of twentieth century late
industrialization holds the clue to why industrial groups did
not evolve in earlier episodes of catching up, why big
business in late industrialization initially became
diversified rather than specialized, and why diversification
took the form of technological unrelatedness.
lal The Nolty I Twentieth Diversification
There is little evidence that eighteenth or nineteenth
century firms in countries attempting to catch-up with the
world technological frontier used a strategy of
diversification as a way to expand. Textile firms in France
or Germany, for instance, remained specialized in textiles
throughout the period of the First Industrial Revolution
(Landes, 1962). Pennsylvania iron manufacturers in the
nineteenth century integrated only into coal production and
railroads (Temin, 1972). Why, then, did diversification
became a strategy of firms in countries attempting to catch
up in the twentieth century but not earlier?
The answer, we suspect, lies in the changing nature of
technology and in the deepening of international technology
markets over time.
Obviously for a firm to diversify into different
industries it requires different industry-specific know-how.
The more technologically unrelated its targeted set of
industries is, the more differentiated is the knowledge it
requires. Postwar diversification by a single firm into
20
technologically unrelated industries was facilitated by the
increasing codification of technology and interrelatedly, by
the widening opportunities to buy foreign technology from
advanced-country suppliers.
While no technology is ever completely documented, with
all of its characteristics being fully specified and
thoroughly understood (Dosi, 1988; Nelson, 1987; Rosenberg,
1976), the formation of university and industrial
laboratories in Europe and the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries subjected production
technologies to greater scientific investigation and
explication (for the detailed case of Du Pont with its MIT
connections, see Hounshell and Smith, 1988). This
codification facilitated technology transfer from one firm to
another. In turn, the length of the commercial product cycle
became shorter, thereby increasing the supply of technologies
which enterprises were willing to sell. Simultaneously,
technological revolutions in communications and
transportation made the logistics of international transfer
easier.
Technology flows, measured as (a) total world receipts
of royalties and fees (say, for foreign licenses), (b)
developed countries' exports of capital goods, and (c)
technical assistance to developing countries, rose from
roughly $27 billion in 1962, to $92.2 billion in 1972, to
$356 billion in 1982. This is a 13-fold increase compared
with only a 3-fold increase in the unit value index of all
21
manufactures exported by developed countries over the same
time period. Royalties and fees alone, although much smaller
in total value than developed countries' capital goods
exports, tripled in value in the single decade between 1972
and 1982 (UNCTAD, 1987, p. 88).
(b) Diversification Y Specializatiaon
Still, the availability of technology is only a
permissive factor in the rise of diversified industrial
groups. What remains to be shown is why firms made the
strategic choice to diversify rather than specialize. By the
late 19th century diversification had become a common generic
strategy of all large industrial enterprises in modern
economies. What varied was the nature and degree to which
enterprises diversified away from their "flagship" or major
initial industry.
In the case of leading multidivisional firms from
advanced countries, the basis of diversification was their
proprietary core teznnology, which they exploited in related
industries (Chandler, 1977; 1990). In the case of Siemens, a
German electrical giant, it used its core technology of
electrical generation and transmission to diversify before
the First World War into telephone and telegraph equipment,
storage batteries, electro-chemicals and fertilizers, and
electrical locomotives and railroad equipment (Weiher and
Goetzeler, 1977). In the case of DuPont, a leading American
producer of chemicals, it utilized its core technology of
22
organic chemicals in explosives to branch out into artificial
leather, paints, dyestuffs, films, and rayon (Hounshell and
Smith, 1988).
Leading firms in more "backward" European countries ---
catching up beginning in the nineteenth century --- followed
a similar basic pattern. In the case of Nuovo Pignone, the
Italian high-tech engineering group, it was established as a
foundry in 1846 and invented the world's first very high-
pressure reciprocating compressor for ammonia production in
1920. By the 1990s Nuovo Pignone was still specializing in
the production of compressors and gas turbines (although
shortly before, it had become part of the state-owned ENI
energy and chemicals concern) (Roverato, 1991). The biggest
manufacturers in Sweden today also originated in proprietary
technological breakthroughs during the Second Industrial
Revolution: the basis of L.M. Ericsson (founded in 1876) was
the telephone; that of Alfa Laval (1879), the separator; that
of ASEA (1890), electrical equipment; and that of SKF
(1907), precision bearings. In spite of their sheer size,
these companies' product lines are still relatively focused,
and their growth strategy and corporate structure have been
those of multidivisional enterprises rather than those
diversified industrial groups. Not all firms involved in a
catching-up exercise, therefore, take the route of the
postwar late industrializer and diversify broadly into
technologically unrelated industries.
The difference in the behavior of European and late-
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industrializing companies appears to be functionally related
to the existence or nonexistence of an original, proprietary
technology to exploit. The former, with pioneering products
and processes, could diversify around a single technology
family. The latter, without one, could not.
If the late-industrializing firm is specialized in
producing a "low-tech" product with a highly labor-intensive
production technology not subject to economies of scale (say,
apparel), then even if it exports all its output, and even if
its domestic wage costs do not rise, it can still expect to
be undersold in international markets (given technology
diffusion) unless it is producing in the world's lowest wage
country. Barring its being located in such a country, and
notwithstanding investing in incremental productivity
improvements, the specialized apparel producer can expect
only a finite profit-making time horizon in a world with
rapid technology diffusion in labor-intensive goods. (If the
economy in which the firm is operating is also growing, and
domestic wages are rising, the firm's profit-making time
horizon will be even shorter.) Thus, to continue to expand,
the apparel producer either has to relocate in a lower wage
country or diversify.
If the late-industrializing firm is specialized in
producing a capital-intensive "mid-tech" product subject to
scale economies, then it can also expect to reach a growth
barrier (if only temporary), but one imposed by firms from
developed rather than underdeveloped countries. Even if the
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firm establishes a production facility of optimal scale, and
even if it invests in incremental productivity and quality
improvements, it can still expect to be out-competed in world
markets by its technology suppliers (unless they stop or slow
the pace of their own innovating). The firm in question
might have grown rapidly in its early phase of foreign
technology acquisition by selling in a protected domestic
market or even in a "soft" export market segment. It might
also grow rapidly again in the future if it can innovate on a
world-scale. But in the interim, the firm faces a slow march
down its learning curve, and diversification is a possible
way to maintain its early growth momentum.
L.cL Technologically Unrelated Diversification
Finally, it needs to be shown why the late-
industrializing firm chooses to diversify so broadly, into
industries that are technologically unrelated. Tables 4 and
5 illustrate the breadth of unrelated diversification in the
extreme case of the two largest late-industrializing business
groups, Hyundai and Samsung respectively (by the 1990s, the
rank order of these two groups had reversed). Although
Samsung started its career mainly in labor-intensive
industries, it rapidly branched out into capital-intensive
production and services. The opposite was true of Hyundai,
which began mostly in heavy industry and then branched out
into light-manufacturing and services. There has thus been
convergence in the business composition of both groups as
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each has diversified widely. This is a typical game of
oligopolistic rivalry, named the "complete set principle" for
Japanese postwar groups (Miyazaki, 1980).
Given access to foreign technology, unrelated
diversification is a phenomenon related to economic
underdevelopment and unequal profit rates across industries.
In the case of a developed economy, it may be defined as
having rates of profit tending towards equality within and
among sectors (agriculture, industry, and services) (Kaldor,
1966). If multidivisional enterprises from advanced
economies choose to diversify, then they tend to enter
related industries (vertically or horizontally) in order to
minimize transactions costs, which are of overriding concern
under conditions of inter-industry profit equalization
(Williamson, 1975).
By contrast, countries just starting industrialization
usually have widely different inter-industry profit rates,
with low, or undefined rates in "pre-modern" industries
(awaiting transformation by foreign technology).
Diversification decisions, therefore, tend to be driven not
by minimizing transactions costs but by prospects of
appropriating the exceptional profits available in pre-modern
industries --- whether or not these industries are related to
a firm's initial business focus. Of course, as Leff (1978;
1979) notes, diversification in developing countries is
often motivated by the unavailability of inputs and other
market imperfections that induce vertical integration and
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related diversification (for the case of the Lucky-Goldstar
group in Korea, see Aguilar, 1985a). On the other side of
the coin, conglomerates in advanced countries also buy and
sell firms in unrelated industries in anticipation of capital
gains, as discussed later. Nevertheless, the lure of profits
to late-industrializing firms in pre-modernized industries is
both seductive in and of itself and, in practice, made more
enticing still by the promotional policies of governments.
Therefore, the drive in late industrialization towards
unrelated diversification has tended to predominate over the
drive towards related diversification dictated by
considerations of minimizing transactions cost (although, as
we shall see, compared to specialized firms, entry by
diversified groups into pre-modern, start-up industries may
be transaction-cost saving).
, Turning Technology Acquisition Into a Competitive Asset
Every firm must have access to three types of
technological capabilities: a project execution capability,
a production capability, and an innovation capability
(Westphal, Kim and Dahlman, 1985; Bell and Pavitt, 1993).
Project execution capability refers to the skills required to
establish or expand operating and other corporate facilities,
including undertaking preinvestment feasibility studies,
project management, project engineering (basic and detailed),
procurement, construction, and start-up of operations.
Production capability refers to the skills required to
27
operate the facilities once they are established. Innovation
capability refers to the skills associated with basic and
applied research and related engineering, or creating major
new products and processes.
Every firm also faces a "make-or-buy" decision
concerning which technological elements to buy from outside
and which to make in-house (the decision to develop a
capability in-house we refer to as "internalization" and
"import substitution" when discussing the economy as a
whole). In what follows, we analyze the make-or-buy
technology acquisition decision in the context of late
industrialization and restrict out attention to project
execution). The late-industrializing firm typically cannot
enter a start-up industry by means of acquisition (buying an
existing firm) because either firms do not exist at all in
start-up industries or those that do exist and are attractive
to buy are not for sale (markets for corporate control
typically do not exist in the early phases of such countries'
development). /3 Thus, to diversify, late-industrializing
enterprises must be good at executing projects related to
organic expansion.
In the extreme, a late-industrializing firm can either
internalize all or none of the sub-elements of a project
execution capability. We assume in what follows that basic
engineering is still beyond its reach and, therefore, that it
always buys its designs (product or process) from overseas in
executing new projects. With respect to sourcing every
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sub-element from outside, or buying a "turn-key" transfer, in
the short run a turn-key transfer may be the only option for
an inexperienced late-industrializing firm. In the long run,
internalization may be better because it saves the costs
inherent in oligopolistic technology markets. Turnkey
transfers especially tend to be expensive because they are
hard to monitor financially. Moreover, it is difficult for a
firm to buy exactly what it needs. Due to intra-firm
information availability, internalization facilitates
customization (Arrow, 1975). Internalization also creates
learning opportunities which, if successfully exploited,
result in a competitive asset that is critical for
diversifying efficiently.
This asset --- the capability to establish or expand
plants with in-house technological skills (even if
unpackaging foreign technology acquisition and
internalization are only partial) --- appreciates in value
through a deliberate process of learning-by-doing and then
"remembering-by-doing" (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The
greater the number or frequency of projects the firm
undertakes itself, the greater the knowledge acquired about
project execution. Other things equal, the frequency of
project execution is greater in diversified industrial groups
than in single product firms. Therefore, the diversified
industrial group has greater opportunities than the single
product firm to routinize this function and acquire a
competitive asset in the generic form of project execution
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skills which it can use for its own expansion within and
across industries, and possibly even sell on the market to
other firms.
The advantages of the diversified group over the single
product firm in acquiring technology to enter a "new" (for
the country) start-up industry exist whether the decision
taken is to "make" or "buy" technology, although if the
"make" (internalization) choice succeeds, the advantages grow
wider due to learning-by-doing. Suppose the decision of both
the group and the specialist firm is to enter a start-up
industry with a turnkey transfer. Then if there is learning-
by-doing associated with the transactions involved in
identifying and negotiating a turn-key --- no matter what the
industry --- , then the group will be more experienced even at
this task than the specialist.
Now suppose both the group and the specialist decide to
enter a start-up industry by unpackaging foreign technology
acquisition and using selected project execution skills from
in-house. If such skills have already been internalized,
then the cost of such skills can also be expected to be
lower. They are lower than the costs of the specialist for
reasons related to: (a) learning-by-doing, which increases
efficiency and is greater the larger the number of project
executions; (b) utilizing capacity, which improves because
the group can pro-rate the fixed, once-and-for-all, initial
cost of acquiring a generic project execution sub-element
over more projects; and (c) saving transactions cost, by
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having the human resources in-house necessary for project
execution (detailed engineering, procurement, supervision,
construction, and so forth). The firm then need not incur
the search costs and time delays associated with finding the
right persons for these tasks on the market. Since a "first-
mover" advantage may be critical in a start-up industry, the
entry time factor is significant.
These points are illustrated in Figure I. In the
"flagship" or existing industry A of Firm 1 (the firm that
diversifies), if sequential plant expansions in A are all
accomplished by means of turnkey technology transfers, this
same transaction will be subject to learning-by-doing (up to
a point) owing to repetition, and the firm will move down
learning curve TKT. If, on the other hand, the decision is
made to internalize all or selected elements of technology
acquisition with respect to project execution, then Firm 1
moves down learning curve INT, depicting learning associated
with internalization. Internalization involves educational
opportunity costs, so for early plant expansions in A,
learning curve INT lies above learning curve TKT. If,
however, internalization succeeds and potential learning-by-
doing is captured, then INT falls below TKT. Just as
learning to produce new products is subject to increasing
returns, so too learning to establish new plants is subject
to increasing returns, so learning curve INT does not level
off the way learning curve TKT does.
Next, as firm 1 with prior experience in project
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execution enters a new start-up industry, B, it is able to do
so faster and with lower direct labor requirements than a
virgin, single-product firm (F2) for the three reasons noted
above. The diversifying firm's initial direct labor
requirements and time requirements are smaller owing to lower
search costs, pure learning-by-doing, and the fact that the
fixed education costs already incurred for internalization
are being spread over a rising number of transactions. Note,
however, that the technical requirements of industry B may be
such that firm l's time and resource requirements may be no
different from what they were in industry A; simply its
advantage is relative to that of the specialized firm.
It may be worth adding that internalization of project
execution capabilities tends to have spillovers to the other
two major types of technology acquisition we already
mentioned: production and innovation capabilities. When
technology acquisition is unpackaged and internalized, the
firm gets a clearer idea of the characteristics of the plant
that it is establishing (expanding). With such "hands on"
understanding, operating the plant becomes easier, and
introducing new improvements into the plant's design becomes
more simple as well (see Amsden, 1989, chs. 11 and 12). As a
consequence of developing production capabilities, the most
successful groups have tended, at the operating level, to
diversify their product lines in related ways, while at the
group level engaging in unrelated diversification in terms of
industries (Jung, 1987 and Cho, 1989 for the Korean case).
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A project execution asset is subject to another type of
increasing return when the nature of technology acquisition
changes. If the firm succeeds in moving from low-, to mid-,
to high-technology production, the practical availability of
basic design technology on the market declines. The firm
must invest more in developing its own technology and
simultaneously, must switch from a mode of buying disembodied
skills from foreign technical assistants to one of buying
high-tech foreign firms themselves. Thus, due to its
constantly changing character, the project execution function
related to the establishment and expansion of plants holds
the potential for earning increasing returns.
We turn now to demonstrating how project execution
capabilities were converted into a competitive asset by
some of South Korea's largest diversified industrial groups.
6. Managing the Creation f Project Execution Capability:
South Korea /4
In the period of intense industrialization that began
after the Korean War, the maiden, large-scale investment
projects of virtually all major Korean companies were
established by means of turnkey technology transfers (Kim,
1993). Turnkeys were especially pronounced in the continuous
process industries such as soap, cement, and petrochemicals,
characterized by high capital requirements and little
opportunity for reverse engineering (Enos and Park, 1988).
Nevertheless, the Korean companies that went on to
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become industrial leaders (numerous companies failed in the
1960s and 1970s) almost immediately began investing in the
internalization of as many elements as possible of imported
production and project execution capabilities. Partly they
did so out of a long historical tradition. One of Korea's
most articulate Westernizers, Yu Kil Chun, exhorted his
country to invest in learning and indigenize foreign know-how
as early as 1895:
Don't simply employ engineers from foreign
countries. Rather than that, it is important to
have the people of Korea learn the proper skills so
that they can then carry on the work on their own.
The potential of human beings is limitless while
machinery breaks down. If a country becomes
skilled in a particular knowledge, it will be able
to transfer this knowledge to future generations
(cited in Eckert, 1993).
Additional reasons for internalization of project
execution capabilities beginning in the 1960s related to
market imperfections and other costs, and corporate growth
strategies that were self-consciously long-term in
perspective. That Korea's big business groups conceived of
themselves as stable, long run players is evident from the
case of Samsung. Reborn in 1951 after an indifferent start
in 1938, Samsung founded the Cheil Sugar Company in 1953 and
then the Cheil Wool Textile Company only one year later (the
woolen textile industry was subject at the time to less
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domestic competition than the cotton textile industry, which
was Korea's leading sector). Even at the very onset of
operations and amidst acute postwar dislocations, Cheil Wool
showed a belief in its ability to survive and planned for the
long term. In addition to buying technical assistance from
its machinery supplier, Samsung independently hired an
experienced Japanese textiles engineer as adviser, who drew
up a master 30 year engineering plan that Cheil Wool
ultimately accomplished 20 years hence.
In the case of the world's largest shipyard established
in 1972 by the Hyundai group, learning was driven by the
imperative to reduce throughput time in order to meet
delivery schedules. To gain firmer control over its process,
to ensure more timely delivery of both inputs and outputs, to
reduce costs, and to achieve parity with Japanese shipyards
on all fronts, the shipbuilding division of Hyundai Heavy
Industries decided to develop even basic design capability
in-house and to produce its own engines and core electrical
equipment. Hyundai's shipyard had been sourcing its engines
from Japan, which built marine engines under license from a
handful of longstanding European firms. But Japanese engine
manufacturers charged higher prices to foreign shipbuilders
than to Japanese ones (Cho and Porter, 1986).
In the case of POSCO (Pohang Iron and Steel Company), a
specialized state-owned enterprise and possibly the world's
lowest cost steel producer by the 1990s, its planned capacity
expansion was so large that it came on stream in four phases.
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The declining reliance on external engineering services for
sequential capacity additions is indicated by the fact that
foreign engineering services decreased from $6.13/ton in
Phase I to $0.11/ton in Phase IV, despite the fact that
capacity additions were about equal (or at least substantial)
in all four phases. POSCO was able to accomplish this
internalization owing to heavy investments in human resources
complementary with an initial turnkey technology transfer
(mainly from Shin Nippon Steel Company of Japan). The single
most distinct feature of this participation was POSCO's
dispatch of a large number of engineers and front-line
supervisors for overseas training even before plant
operations had begun. It is indeterminate whether or not
POSCO's large investments in human resources were "efficient"
in the sense of being immediately cost-effective. There was
never any doubt, however, that POSCO intended eventually to
internalize foreign technology acquisition, which it
subsequently usea to establish another integrated steel
facility and then to diversify into ceramics and other high-
tech industrial materials.
Whatever the influence of short-run cost considerations
in make-or-buy decisions, clearly Korea's big business groups
internalized project execution capabilities only step-by-
step, rather than in a great leap. In the case of the
Hyundai group's cement making subsidiary, for instance, the
sequential internalization of project execution capabilities
is indicated in Table 6. In its initial plant project,
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Hyundai's technology supplier undertook all tasks except
construction. In its second plant expansion ten years later,
Hyundai participated in all tasks except basic engineering.
Similarly in POSCO, on the basis of participating in plant
erections and in operating mills established in Phase I,
POSCO acquired capabilities to undertake preliminary
engineering planning, preparation of procurement
specifications for auxiliary facilities (power transmission
and distribution systems), and other tasks in Phase II.
Not only did the internalization of project execution
skills ultimately lower fixed investment costs for successful
enterprises. It also improved industry-specific production
capabilities. The acquisition of basic design skills helped
Hyundai reduce throughput time in building ships. The same
manager in POSCO who participated in the foreign technology
transfer of a particular facility --- say, a blast furnace --
-, was appointed operating manager of that same facility
because the more intimate a manager's familiarity with the
architecture and capital equipment of a plant, the greater
the manager's ability to produce efficiently in that plant.
The generic project execution (and even production)
capabilities acquired in one subsidiary were diffused
throughout a business group by means of deliberate
investments in human resources and coordination. In the case
of Hyundai, whose flagship industry was construction, it used
its cement plant as a laboratory to train its construction
managers before assigning them to new manufacturing
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affiliates in other industries. Trainees gained experience
in inventory management, quality and process control,
capacity planning, and so forth, thus spreading basic middle
and lower managerial production-related skills throughout the
Hyundai organization. Diversification into a new industry by
the Hyundai group was typically undertaken by a task force,
formed at the group level and comprising qualified managers,
engineers, and even supervisors recruited from existing
companies within the group. Managers from Hyundai's
construction arm, for example, were transferred to its
shipbuilding arm to aid in initial project management.
Later, engineers from its shipbuilding arm, who had a
knowledge of anticorrosion, were loaned to its automobile
affiliate where a new paint operation was coming on stream.
The first president of Hyundai Motors was a former president
of Hyundai Cement.
In the case of the Samsung group, it was one of the
first chaebc to build a group-wide training system soon
after establishing its first manufacturing affiliate (in
1953). All new managers were recruited and trained at the
group level. They were then dispatched, at the company's
discretion, to affiliates. Inter-affiliate communication was
facilitated by the closeness of graduates of the same
training class. Given its stature, Samsung began to attract
the top university graduates for its middle management posts
(another advantage of the group form of business in late
industrialization), and professional management diffused to
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all parts of the company. Policies towards technology
acquisition were articulated at the group level such that
project execution norms evolved, an example being the hiring
of third-party consultants to check on the efficiency of
technology transfers.
Not just in Samsung but in other Korean groups, the
established practice became one of initiating new entrants
not only into the particular subsidiary to which they were
assigned but also into the group as a whole (Janelli, 1993;
for Daewoo, see Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989; for a small
conglomerate specialized in defense-related industries, see
Kim, 1992). This kind of group training and identity-
building are almost unheard of in the American conglomerate.
In Korea, they have facilitated the group-level sharing of
technological capabilities assimilated within an industry.
However great the unrelatedness of diversification by
the chaebol (Tables 4 and 5 indicated the scope of
diversification in Hyundai and Samsung respectively), no
industry was ever established in Korea even in the early
1990s for which foreign technology was unavailable.
Nevertheless, as Korean business advanced in technological
complexity, foreign technology became increasingly difficult
to access, as in the case of POSCO's second integrated steel
facility (Japanese steel makers refused altogether to sell
POSCO technology), or in the case of Samsung's electronics
and semiconductor investments (foreign companies supplied
technology to Samsung but at high prices, with royalty
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payments placing a heavy burden on profits). Therefore, big
business in Korea increased its expenditures on in-house R&D
and changed the form in which it acquired technology from
abroad. Increasingly, foreign technology was acquired either
by buying financially-troubled foreign high-tech firms (in,
for instance, Silicon Valley) or by locating Korean R&D
laboratories overseas, in close proximity to technology
leaders. In the case of Samsung, for instance, it
established the Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology in
October 1987 to undertake basic research in semiconductors.
Then it opened an Advanced Media Laboratory in September 1989
in New Jersey, near AT&T Technologies' Lab. Next it opened
an R&D branch in September 1990 in Osaka, near the Matsushita
Corporation.
Thus, the substance of generic, group-wide project
execution capability changed from sourcing technology from
foreign suppliers to establishing R&D facilities, buying
foreign high-tech firms, and locating "listening posts"
overseas. Due to these changes, there was further scope for
learning associated with the sharable asset of project
execution capability, thereby sustaining increasing returns.
7. Conglomerates: Differing Syls Q Advanced Economies w
Latecomers
In terms of their basic strategy and structure, there is
a resemblance between diversified business groups in late-
industrializing countries and conglomerates in the United
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States (and to a lesser extent Britain) that emerged in the
1950s. Both faced difficult circumstances in terms of
stunted growth potential in their flagship industries. Many
American conglomerates came from sectors such as public
utilities, transportation, textiles, mining, and food, whose
technological trajectories had been exhausted (at least
temporarily), and/or whose product markets were experiencing
slow growth (for the U.S.: Rumelt, 1974 and 1982 and
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; for the U.K.: Singh, 1971 and
1975; for the latest theoretical overview, Clarke, 1987). As
long as firms in these dead-end industries enjoyed free cash
flow from prior investments, many looked for new investment
opportunities through industry diversification. In a
different economic environment, late-industrializing firms
also confronted growth barriers, as discussed above. Either
their domestic markets were small relative to their corporate
growth potential, or the sustainability of their products
(both low-and mid-tech) in international markets was not
well-founded in the short run. Their absence of proprietary
technology further meant that they could not diversify into
related product lines.
To overcome demand and technology constraints, American
conglomerates and late-industrializing groups both
aggressively diversified their investment portfolios into a
wide range of technologically unrelated industries within a
short duration of time. The resulting corporate structures
from this diversification strategy were sprawling collections
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of individual operating units or subsidiaries administered by
corporate headquarters. For instance, Gulf & Western, at its
height of conglomerate growth in 1969, operated 37 divisions
spanning automobile parts and life insurance, precision
equipment and movie production (Berg, 1973). In 1983, Lucky-
Goldstar, one of the "Big Four" Korean ca.ebol (ranked third
in Table 3), had 42 operating subsidiaries ranging from
electronics to oil refinery, from cosmetics to securities
dealing (Aguilar, 1985a).
Despite a similarity in basic strategy and structure,
the economic performance of the two types of conglomerate
firms was markedly different. As Tables 1, 2, and 3
indicate, many diversified groups, particularly Korean
chaebol (and Japanese zaibata, keiretsu, and kigy shudan
before theml, grew to become stable players in international
markets in a wide range of products. On the other hand,
American conglomerates had to regain their economic health by
decreasing their number of operating industries and by
increasing the degree of business-relatedness within their
firm (Williams, Paez, and Snaders, 1988; Lichtenberg, 1992).
American conglomerates have survived by retrenching,
divesting, and de-conglomerating themselves.
Two basic factors caused the performance differences of
American conglomerates and successful late-industrializing
business groups. One relates to exogenous market
imperfections and the other to the potential governance and
multiproduct externalities internal to the firm.
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First, to the extent that countries starting to
industrialize in the 1960s and even 1970s operated with
highly imperfect markets (for products, finance, and
information), the internalization of markets through
conglomerate behavior, unjustified in the American case given
more mature markets, could bring real economic gains for both
the firm and country (this is the gist of arguments by Leff,
1978 and 1979). For instance, among the major possible
reasons for diversification is risk reduction, a motive which
finds little theoretical support in the United States on the
ground that, aumin erfect stock market. all possible
gains of risk reduction can be realized equivalently or
better by shareholders themselves holding diversified market
portfolios (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). To the extent that
capital markets in late industrializing countries are
underdeveloped (or over-regulated), in the absence of
diversified stockholding, risk pooling by the firm itself
through product and industry diversification are
theoretically warranted, and give the diversified firm an
edge over the specialized firm in terms of steadier earnings
growth.
Second, a major source of the performance difference
between conglomerates in advanced economies and late
industrialization relates to the functional areas of learned
capabilities and the resulting nature of sharable knowledge.
In the United States, where a market for corporate control
was well-established, conglomerate growth mainly took the
I
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form of expansion through acquisition. Growth through
acquisition was much less frequent in late industrialization,
and when it did occur, usually took the form of firms buying
ailing companies (often state-owned or state-financed) with
the aim of turning-them around, whereas in the United States,
acquisition was typically of enterprises with above-average
profit rates (Ravenscroft and Scherer, 1987).
Diversification through acquisition rather than organic
growth in the United States was regarded as more efficient
and less risky (particularly for those enterprises with no
proprietary technology) since it involved the acquisition of
market-tested physical assets and human capabilities.
Furthermore, entry was achieved without initially having to
compete for market share. As long as American conglomerates
repeated this type of acquisitive transaction, their learned
knowledge became concentrated in the financial expertise for
corporate control: finding appropriate companies to buy that
were suitable for their future growth, and possibly locating
buyers for divisions that were found to be unsuitable for
their portfolios.
While the top management of American conglomerates
continuously exploited and nurtured their capabilities in
financial transactions, their operating units could also
develop their own production capabilities independently and
separately. These capabilities could, in theory, create
sharable knowledge for future related diversification.
Contrary to popular notion, top management involved their
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operating units in the pursuit of efficiency and technology-
related goals (Nangia, 1972). Nevertheless, given that top
management's skills were largely financial, its way of
evaluating and developing the potential of operating units
was financially-determined. Corporate offices remained
relatively small and dominated by financial functions (Berg,
1973). The small pool of human resources at the corporate
office, given the number of acquisition transactions which
some of the conglomerate firms undertook, inevitably resulted
in an overload for decision-makers. This Penrosian dynamic
constraint further forced corporate offices to concentrate on
the financial control of operating units. Accordingly,
individual operating units remained separate, independent
entities, with little contact among themselves. Each
retained its pre-acquisition practices and procedures
concerning purchasing, research and development, marketing,
and even accounting. An effective and coherent internal
labor market never materialized, which prohibited the
conglomerate from capturing possible sharable knowledge in
technology and organization. The only altered functions
pertained to external finance, borrowing, and auditing (Boyle
and Jaynes, 1972; Winslow, 1973).
Thus, there were no spillovers related to technological
learning which, in the case of successful conglomerates from
late-industrializing countries, proved a competitive asset
against specialized firms. By comparison with specialized
firms and multidivisional enterprises in advanced countries,
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with core proprietary technologies in specific industries,
the American conglomerate developed no distinguishing set of
competitive capabilities. Not surprisingly, its economic
performance remained mediocre (Mueller, 1977; Hay and Morris,
1991, ch. 14).
By contrast, successful diversified groups from late-
industrializing countries tried to capture as many
externalities as possible by establishing a coordination
mechanism in the corporate office. By the 1980s, for
instance, all the major chaebl had a functionally-
departmentalized planning and coordination office kijosie)
whose size was substantially larger and more balanced than
its counterpart in American conglomerate (Chang and Choi,
1988; Lee, 1990). Once a group developed project execution
capabilities in one industry in the process of borrowing
foreign technology, therefore, top management could utilize
them in two ways, as we tried to demonstrate in the case of
Korea. /5 First, it transferred such "fungible"
capabilities from industry to industry in order to lower
entry costs. Given constant changes in both the process of
foreign technology acquisition and subsequent investment
projects, these capabilities were exposed to further learning
opportunities such that increasing returns from learning-by-
doing could be captured (Stokey, 1988). Second, project
execution capabilities had potential positive spillovers to
learning industry-specific production skills. By definition,
the engineering component in executing investment projects
-----Cii ___1_1
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requires knowledge of the manufacturing process for which the
plant is being designed. The more manufacturing managers
understand their plant through participating in its erection,
the greater their ability to fine-tune operations.
Successful diversified groups actively and deliberately
exploited these types of accumulated sharable inputs by
strategically transferring engineering personnel from
subsidiary to subsidiary within the group and facilitating
general and specialized training programs at the group level.
This allowed the group to exploit learned project-related
capabilities to the full extent.
8. Conclusion
We have analyzed the phenomenon of diversified
industrial groups emerging in a wide array of historically
and culturally distinct late-industrializing countries,
ranging from the chaebol (and, in principle, the zaibatsu) in
East Asia to los grupos in Latin America. We rely for our
analysis on resource-base theories of corporate growth and
the historical specificity of twentieth century "late
industrialization", a transformation based on pure learning
or borrowing already-commercialized foreign technology in
well-articulated international markets.
Through a learning process associated with internalizing
the elements of foreign technology acquisition, especially
related to establishing or expanding a plant facility
(attainment of basic and detailed engineering, equipment
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procurement, supervision, construction, and start-up), the
business group could acquire a generic asset that enabled it
to diversify into start-up industries relatively quickly and
at low cost. Subsequently, sharable technical knowledge
could accumulate through foreign technology absorption that
could have a positive spillover on production capabilities,
constituting another competitive asset in the market (we
illustrate our argument briefly with evidence from South
Korea, where the group form of business among late-
industrializers has been most advanced).
Using this as the core of our argument, we can explain
why firms attempting to catch-up in previous
industrializations did not diversify, why big business in
late industrialization initially became diversified rather
than specialized, and why diversification involved
technologically unrelated industries.
We contrast the diversified group of late
industrialization and the conglomerate of advanced economies
to the extent that a market for corporate control allowed the
latter to diversify through acquisition, whereas the absence
of such a market in the early phase of late industrialization
required organic, internal growth, facilitated by the
sharable asset of project execution capability. These
contrasting growth paths resulted in different types of
competitive assets: finance-focused for the conglomerate and
technology-related for the diversified business group.
This provides a framework for further comparisons of
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conglomerate behavior and performance in different countries
and historical settings. Heretofore when business groups
were examined, it was usually in the context of the Japanese
zaibatsu and keiretsu. This paper shows that Japanese groups
historically exhibited many of the same characteristics that
distinguish the diversified business groups discussed above.
This is because Japan historically represents the "first
mover" in the late industrialization paradigm (Amsden, 1989).
Given our argument that foreign technology absorption
provides the foundation in late industrialization for the
creation of group-wide organizational know-how with respect
to project execution (and interrelatedly, production), we
would expect that business groups that do not create and
internally diffuse such knowhow --- possibly owing to foreign
tie-ins or other factors --- would perform less competitively
than groups that do create and diffuse it.
Already our framework allows us to interpret why the
evolutionary sequence of business structures in advanced
economies and late industrialization is different. In the
Williamsonian evolution (1975 and 1985, ch. 11), the
organizational sequence in advanced economies is from the U-
Form (unitary structure) of business organization, to the M-
Form (multidivisional structure), and then to the
conglomerate form. By contrast, the conglomerate form of
business organization has tended to come first in late
industrialization. To the extent that business groups can
exploit multi-product externalities, they may slowly move
_______________I__I_______
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toward being multidivisional.
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Footnotes
1. Space precludes discussion of the business groups from
sociological or anthropological viewpoints. For a convenient
set of references on East Asia, see Whitley (1992); for a
sophisticated account of one Korean case, see Janelli (1993).
2. The phenomenal development of Japan's corporate groups
(the prewar zaibatsu and postwar kigyo shudan and keiretsu).
needs more than a brief summary, which is why we have not
included mention of them. Among the voluminous literature
available on this subject, what is particularly useful
includes: for the established zaibatsu groups, Hirschmeier
and Yui (1981), Wray (1984), Okochi and Yasuoka (1984),
Kobayashi (1985), Yonekura (1985), Mishima (1989), Morikawa
(1992); for the new zaibatsu groups emerging in the 1920s and
1930s, Shimotani (1984), Saito (1985), Cusumano (1989),
Molony (1990), and Shimotani (1991); and, for the postwar
kigyo shudan and keiretsu, Miyazaki (1980), Sato (1980), Aoki
(1984), Sato and Hoshino (1984), Futatsugi (1986), Sheard
(1986), Aoki (1990), Shimotani (1991), Fruin (1992), Imai
(1992), Gerlach (1992), Miyajima (1994) and Okumura
(forthcoming).
3. Korean firms began diversifying in the 1950s, but only in
the 1980s did they sometimes expand by means of acquisition
(Kim, 1987). Before then, if they expanded through
acquisition, it usually involved a government-related
transaction, as discussed in Section 6.
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4. Unless otherwise specified, all information in this
section is from Amsden (1989; 1994).
5. The government of successful late industrializers
eventually lessened the administrative overload of groups'
top management with respect to resource allocation, when it
provided subsidies to promote specific industries and thereby
clearly signaled which industries the groups should enter
(Amsden, 1989, chs. 3 and 4).
Business-government relations in late industrialization,
however, have not always been productive owing to rent
seeking opportunities, as evidenced by the Philippines under
the Marcos regime (Koike, 1989). For a theoretical
examination of the effectiveness of business-government
relations, see Amsden (1992).
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Figure I
Project Execution Capability
Diversified (F1) vs. Single Product Firm (F2)
Start-p Industry(B)
(B)
Existing Industry
(A)
Cost
Number of plant expansion transactions
Cost = P(TKT) + P(INT), where TKT is turnkey transfer and INT
is internalization (measured as time x number of people).
__ _ _
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Table 1
he Distribution of Wrld's 500 Larest Industrial
Enterprises. by Cauntry 19i62 and 1992
Coguntrv Year
1962 1992
Developed market economies
(except Japan) total 462 339
United States 297 161
United Kingdom 55 41
Germany 36 32
France 27 30
Sweden 8 14
Switzerland 6 9
Australia 2 9
Canada 13 8
Netherlands 5 7
Italy 7 6
Norway 0 5
Belgium 3 4
Finland 0 4
Others 2 9
Japan 31 128
Other Late-industrializing
countries total 4 33
South Korea 0 12
South Africa 2 4
India 1 3
Turkey 0 3
Others 1 11
Total 497 500
Source: For 1962, adopted and reorganized from John H.
Dunning and Robert D. Pearce, The World's LarggEt Industrial
Enterprises. 1962-19J_ 8 New York, St. Martin's, 1985. For
1992, compiled from "Fortune's Global 500," FrtuneL July 26,
1993.
Note: Enterprises, including private and state-owned, are
from market economies only and are ranked by sales. Firms
included are manufacturers which often engage in such related
activities as mining and distribution. Because of the lack
of adequate data, 497 companies are listed for 1962.
Because of different disclosure standards, the companies of
late industrialization may be underrepresented.
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Table 2
Distribution f the 70 Largest Industrial Enterprises in
Advanced and Late-Industrializing Economies. 1987
SIC Industry Advanced Economies Late-Industrializing
Economies
Private State Private State
20 Food 4 0 1 0
21 Tobacco 3 0 0 1
22 Textiles 0 0 1 0
23 Apparel 0 0 0 0
24 Lumber 0 0 0 0
25 Furniture 0 0 0 0
26 Paper 0 0 0 0
27 Printing/Publishing 0 0 0 0
28 Chemicals 7 0 2 1
29 Petroleum 14 2 0 28
30 Rubber 0 0 0 0
31 Leather 0 0 0 0
32 Stone/Clay/Glass 1 0 0 0
33 Primary metals 2 3 0 7
34 Fabricated Metals 0 0 0 0
35 Machinery 1 0 0 0
36 Electrical Machinery 12 0 1 1
37 Transportation Eqt. 19 1 0 0
38 Instruments 1 0 0 0
39 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0
-- Conglomerate/ 0 0 26 1
Diversified
TOTAL 64 6 31 39
Source: Advanced economies: Compiled from "The 500 Largest
Industrial Corporations," Fortune. April 25, 1988; "The
Fortune International 500," Fortune. August 1, 1988. Late-
industrializing economies: Compiled from "The Fortune
International 500," Fortune. August 1, 1988; "South 600,"
South August 1988; "Africa 100," South, July 1988; "Latin
America 250," South, May 1988; "Asia 150," South June 1988.
Notes: Listed enterprises are independent parent companies
only. Domestic and foreign subsidiaries are not counted.
Sales figures represent those of entire enterpreses and
groups when data are available. Many groups publish non-
consolidated financial statesments only, so some groups' size
is underrepresented. Industrial category is based on U.S.
Standard Industrial Classification.
-- - --------- ____1.. ~ 1__- ~ 1 _~1(·II~ r_·_ rC~-
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Table 3
The Largest PrivjtL_ Industrial Enterrises in
Late Industriaizatin. 1987
Rank Company Country Sales
(US million
Dollars)
Industry
Hyundai
Samsung
Lucky Goldstar
Daewoo
Barlow Rand
Sunkyong
Tata Group
Koc Holding
Ssangyong
Sabanci Group
Korea Explosives
Hyosung
De Beers
Formosa Plastics
Birla Group
Swire Pacific
Koor Industries
Jardine Matheson
AECI
Copersucar
Doosan
Sasol
Alfa
Tatung
Modi Group
Reliance Inds.
Hutchison-Whampoa
Sime Darby
RPE Enterprises
J.K. Singhania
Dong-A Construct.
Korea
i,
S. Africa
Korea
India
Turkey
Korea
Turkey
Korea
S. Africa
Taiwan
India
Hong Kong
Israel
Hong Kong
S. Africa
Brazil
Korea
S. Africa
Mexico
Taiwan
India
India
Hong Kong
Malaysia
India
India
Korea
25,243
21,053
14,422
13,437
7,617
6,781
4,866
4,738
4,582
4,582
3,563
3,257
3,091
2,955
2,932
2,585
2,571
1,628
1,607
1,512
1,478
1,417
1,380
1,248
1,070
1,015
994
950
930
889
824
Diversified
#I
it
It
t
t
I.
Chemicals
Diversified
Electronics
Diversified
Textiles
Diversified
Source: See Table 2, entry for "Late-industrializing
economies."
Notes: *Publicly-owned, professionally managed. +Owned by
Israeli trade union federation. #Cooperative. IMalaysian
government holds controlling influence.
Many groups publish non-consolidated financial statements
only, so some groups' size is under-represented. Listed
enterprises are independent parent companies only. Domestic
and foreign subsidiaries are not counted. Information on
industrial activities and control comes from company
directories of appropriate countries.
Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Family
#I
Prof.*
Family
Govt
i,
I,
Union+
Family
i,
Coop. #
Family
Family
Govt.
Family
_  _  _ _ _ __ _
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Table 4
Major Diversifications of yundai Group Under
Chairman Chung Ju-Yuna, 1938-1987
1940 Automobile repair
1947 Construction
1955 Marine and fire insurance
1962 Securities dealing
1967 Automobile assembly (later production)
1968 Real estate
1972 Shipbuilding
1974 Automobile sales
Engineering
1975 Steel structures and pipes
Ship repair
Construction materials
1976 Overseas commercial banking
Overseas general trading
Ocean shipping
1977 Precision machinery
1978 (Iron and steel making)
Electrical engineering
(Aluminum refining)
Wooden products and furniture
1983 Electronics
1984 Elevator manufacture
1986 Housing and industrial development
Compiled from Business Korea Yearbook, various years.
Parentheses indicate acquisitions. In 1988 Hyundai
diversified into investment banking and management,
petrochemicals, and industrial robots.
--------------- 
_ 
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Table 5
Ma jor Diversifications of Samsunan Group Under
Chairnan L , hjl ,
1938 Overseas trading
1953 Sugar regining
1954 Woolen textile manufacturing
1963 Broadcasting
(Life insurance)
(Department store)
1965 Newspaper publishing
Entertainment
1966 Hospital administration
1967 (Paper manufacturing)
1969 Electronics
1974 Petrochemicals
Shipbuilding and engineering/machinery
Overseas general trading
1976 Real estate
1977 (Semiconductors)
Precision machinery
1978 Telecommunications
Construction
1982 Sports entertainment
1983 Watchmaking
1984 Medical equipment and supplies
1985 Data processing
1987 Aerospace
Source: Compiled from Business Korea Yearbook, vari-Lus
years.
Note: Parentheses indicate acquisitions. In 1988 Samsung
diversified into computers.
aPIPClsllss···PIP·I·-EIII··-·--·--··
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Table 6
Company's Involvement in plant Erections:
Sequential Internalization
Project Execution
Sub-Element
Basic engineering
Detailed eng.
Procurement
Supervision
Construction
Start-Up
Initial Plant
1964
Allis Chalmers
Allis Chalmers
Allis Chalmers
Allis Chalmers
Hyundai
Allis Chalmers
First
Expansion
1968
Fuller
Fuller
Hyundai
Hyundai
Hyundai
Fuller,
Hyundai
Second
Expansion
1974
Fuller
Fuller,
Hyundai
Hyundai
Hyundai
Hyundai
Fuller,
Hyundai
Source: Alice H. Amsden and Linsu Kim, "The Acquisition of
Technological Capability in South Korea," Mimeo, Development
Research Department, Productivity Division, World Bank,
Washington, D.C., as cited in Amsden (1989, p. 267).
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